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Direct-to-consumer e-commerce brand selling seasonal outdoor gear. Strong brand, loyal customer base, profitable.
My Role: Board Member
Holiday season 2016 was huge—sold out of inventory by mid-December, turned away $2M in orders. Founder and I agreed: we'd never miss sales again. For 2017, we pre-ordered 3x inventory based on 2016 demand plus expected growth. Manufacturing required 6-month lead time and 50% deposit. We committed $5M to inventory orders in April 2017 for delivery in October.
Summer 2017: two competitors launched similar products at lower prices. By September, our pre-orders were down 40% from forecast. October: inventory arrives. We have $5M in gear and weak demand. Tried aggressive marketing—spent $800K, only moved 30% of inventory. December: still sitting on $3M of inventory. Tried fire sales, discount retailers—margins evaporated. Spring 2018: still had $1.5M in unsold inventory. Much of it was seasonal—couldn't sell winter gear in summer. Eventually liquidated for $0.20 on dollar. Lost $4M on inventory alone, plus $800K in failed marketing.
Sold out of inventory, turned away orders
Decision to 3x inventory for 2021
$5M inventory order placed
Competitors launch similar products
Pre-orders down 40%
Inventory arrives, weak demand
Failed to move inventory despite heavy marketing
Begin liquidation process
Inventory liquidated at massive loss
"Last year's stockout is not this year's guaranteed demand. Market changes fast."
$5M in direct inventory losses.
Guilt for encouraging founder to "go big" on inventory.
Founder felt I pushed too hard. Stepped off board by mutual agreement.