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Led a real estate investment fund focused on commercial properties in secondary markets. By 2017, we had a strong track record with 18% annual returns over 5 years.
My Role: Managing Partner
In early 2017, we had raised a $60M fund. Warning signs were everywhere—rising default rates, tightening credit, overvalued properties—but I dismissed them as temporary corrections. We had $23M to deploy and a 2-year deployment deadline. Three properties came available at what seemed like good prices. The team was split: two analysts flagged concerns about leverage ratios and market conditions. I overruled them, arguing we had a fiduciary duty to deploy capital. We closed on all three properties between March and August 2017, using aggressive 80% leverage.
By January 2018, occupancy rates started dropping. By September 2018, credit market stress accelerated, and we couldn't refinance. Property values dropped 40%. We tried to sell but there were no buyers. Monthly cash flow went negative as tenants defaulted. Banks called loans. We negotiated extensions but eventually had to hand over two properties to lenders in 2020. The third we sold in 2021 at a 60% loss. Total loss: $23M of the $60M fund. Fund returned 0.35x after fees.
Fund fully raised - $60M committed
First property acquired - $8M
Second property acquired - $9M
Third property acquired - $6M
Occupancy rates begin declining
Credit market stress - refinance becomes difficult
Property values down 25%, cash flow negative
Banks threatening foreclosure
Two properties surrendered to lenders
Third property sold at 60% loss
"Deploying capital is not a fiduciary duty when market conditions are wrong."
$23M direct loss. Fund performance destroyed. LP relationships damaged for 5+ years.
Crushing guilt. Felt responsible for losses by retirees and endowments. Two years of depression.
12 of 18 LPs didn't commit to next fund. Lost credibility in real estate community.