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Media startup with 2M monthly users, strong engagement, solid ad revenue model. Not a unicorn, but profitable and growing 30% annually.
My Role: Board Member
New VP Product from Facebook convinced founder (and me) that we should pivot to video. "Text is dead. Video is the future. Facebook is prioritizing video in newsfeed." We had zero video expertise, but data showed video content got 3x engagement. Board approved plan to shift 60% of content budget to video. Hired 15-person video team. Built studio. Launched "premium video" strategy in Q2 2016.
Video production costs were 5x higher than text. Our audience came for quick, scannable content—not 5-minute videos. Video ads paid less than display ads despite higher CPMs because completion rates were low. Engagement tanked—users felt betrayed by format change. By Q4 2016, Facebook announced they'd been miscounting video metrics (inflated by 60-80%). The entire "pivot to video" premise was based on bad data. We'd alienated our text-focused audience, burned $4M on video infrastructure, and lost advertiser confidence. User growth went negative. We tried to pivot back to text, but momentum was gone. Sold the company in 2018 for $8M—would have been worth $25M+ if we'd stayed the course.
2M users, profitable, steady growth
New VP Product proposes video pivot
Board approves video strategy
Video team hired, studio built
Video content launches
Engagement drops, costs spike
Facebook admits video metric errors
User growth goes negative
Attempt to pivot back to text
Company sold for $8M
"Don't abandon what works chasing what's trendy. Trends often rest on bad data."
$4M wasted on pivot. $17M in lost equity value.
Guilt for convincing founder to abandon winning model.
Lost trust of content team who opposed pivot. Relationship with founder strained.